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ABSTRACT 
Increasing economic integration inevitably draws states to coordinate 
their tax policies, yet policymakers are eager to protect their autonomous 
―tax sovereignty.‖ Cooperation and autonomy are balanced in 
transnational networks, especially the OECD, where state representatives, 
experts, and interest groups engage in continuous negotiation to develop 
nonbinding, or ―soft‖ global tax policy norms. While the merits of these 
norms have prompted much scholarly analysis, little is understood about 
the nature and significance of using networks to develop tax policy norms 
in this manner. This Article demonstrates how and why states use the 
unique soft governance structure of the OECD to develop global tax policy 
norms and achieve national tax policy goals, and explores some of the 
implications of this particular means of balancing the competing goals of 
international cooperation and national autonomy in a politically, socially, 
and economically globalized world.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Increasing economic integration inevitably draws states to coordinate 
their tax policies, as the recent global economic crisis reminds us.
1
 Yet 
politicians, public sector officials, and tax academics and professionals 
have become accustomed to working with a view of the state as a 
―hermetically sealed sphere‖2 of ―tax sovereignty‖—virtually complete 
autonomy in tax law and policy-making.
3
 In some areas of tax regulation, 
 
 
 1. The economic-stimulus efforts of the United States, currently at more than $800 billion in tax 
stimuli and rising, are echoed in legislation adopted by nations around the world. See, e.g., Big 
Government Fights Back, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2009, at 79 (―[T]he plans of 11 big advanced and 
emerging economies are worth an average of 3.6% of GDP—though spread over several years. The 
IMF expects tax cuts and spending worth 1.5% of global GDP to kick in this year.‖). U.S. Treasury 
officials have expressly recognized the need for coordinated tax policy development that is created by 
global economic integration. See, e.g., International Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 
110th Cong. (2008) (―Globalization has made it imprudent for the United States, or any other country, 
to enact tax rules that do not take into account what other countries are doing.‖). 
 2. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in 
THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 9 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) (describing the 
traditional conception of sovereignty as a static attribute). 
 3. See, e.g., Diane M. Ring, What‘s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax and 
the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT‘L L. 155 (2008); Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/2
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especially the WTO regime, states have traded complete autonomy for 
cooperation by forging agreement in a multilateral treaty and by using 
supranational institutions to police violations of agreed-upon legal 
precepts.
4
 But states have not similarly created a binding multilateral 
regime to trade autonomy for cooperation in income tax matters. Instead, 
states have come to rely on ―soft‖ methods for coordinating income 
taxation through network-based collaboration, modeling, peer pressure, 
and emulation to reconcile these competing goals.
5
 The soft law approach 
involves political, social, and economic relationships among states and 
individuals that significantly impact the types of tax norms that arise and 
take root internationally. 
Using transnational networks, the world‘s wealthiest states have built a 
unique institutional infrastructure through which they continuously re-
negotiate, and disseminate globally, a set of mutually agreeable income tax 
standards.
6
 The main component of this infrastructure is the Organisation 
 
 
Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT‘L L. 99 (2009). For a classic discussion of tax sovereignty, see Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, Die Krise des Steuerstaats [The Crisis of the Tax State] (1918), translated in 4 INT‘L 
ECON. PAPERS 5, 33 (1954). The importance of sovereignty as a hurdle to coordination is highlighted 
throughout the historical record of transnational tax policy coordination. See, e.g., Report and 
Resolutions Submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Comm., League of Nations Doc. 
F.212, at 6 (1925) [hereinafter Rpt. of the Comm. of Experts] (stating that coordination of tax policy 
would require states to freely exercise their sovereign powers by adopting uniform laws according to 
their internal legislative processes).  
 4. Tax scholars have studied the various reasons why forms of taxation other than tariffs do not 
fit neatly within the WTO paradigm. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. 
INT‘L L. 1621 (2001). On the other hand, trade scholarship suggests that the WTO may have a broader 
impact on national taxation than many may realize. See, e.g., Michael Daly, WTO Rules on Direct 
Taxation, 29 WORLD ECON. 527 (2006). 
 5. International law scholars use the term ―soft law‖ to describe norms that may not themselves 
constitute law but seem to have effects that evoke a legal process or form because they compel a law-
like sense of obligation in states. See, e.g., C. M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development 
and Change in International Law, 38 INT‘L & COMP. L.Q. 850 (1989); David M. Trubek, Patrick 
Cottrell & Mark Nance, ‗Soft Law‘, ‗Hard Law‘, and EU Integration, in NEW GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EUROPE AND THE US (Joanne Scott & Gráinne De Búrca eds., 2005) 
(suggesting that a hybrid approach, seeking both hard and soft elements, is needed in analyzing issues 
of international law). For a discussion regarding the use of the term in the context of tax policy, see 
Allison Christians, Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation, 25 WIS. INT‘L L.J. 325 (2007). 
 6. See, e.g., Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 
447, 458 (2006) (―[G]lobalization is contested and negotiated.‖). The use of soft law mechanisms as a 
means to bring about ―optimal‖ policy results has received increasing attention across a wide variety of 
policy-making arenas. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal 
Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539 (2007); Louise 
G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006); 
Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance 
Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2005); Judd F. Sneirson, Soft 
Paternalism for Close Corporations: Helping Shareholders Help Themselves, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 899. 
For a contrary view of the prospects for tax policy coordination, see Yariv Brauner, An International 
Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 326 (2003) (arguing for ―a gradual rule-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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for Economic Cooperation and Development (―OECD‖), whose 
membership comprises thirty industrialized countries, including the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and most of Western Europe.
7
 The OECD 
facilitates tax policy development by hosting hundreds of meetings, 
conferences, and workshops for the purpose of producing nonbinding 
norms around which nations can converge.
8
 The OECD describes itself as 
a ―market leader in developing standards and guidelines,‖ and policy 
norms it develops have worldwide impact.
9
 A volume of scholarly analysis 
is accordingly devoted to the merits of tax policy norms produced by the 
OECD. Yet little is understood about the nature and implications of 
developing tax policy norms in this manner.
10
  
This Article demonstrates how states use the unique soft governance 
structure of the OECD to develop global tax policy norms and achieve 
national tax policy goals, and explores some of the implications of this 
particular means of balancing the competing goals of international 
 
 
harmonization effort, preferably led by the OECD‖); Avi Nov, The ―Bidding War‖ to Attract Foreign 
Direct Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 VA. TAX REV. 835 (2006) (arguing that a hard-
law solution in the form of a multilateral agreement is needed to combat the negative effects of 
international tax competition); DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS IN A GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 49 (2004) (suggesting that a multilateral tax organization could ―aim to coordinate 
international cooperation where that would be to mutual advantage but is impeded by transaction 
costs‖). 
 7. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 486 
(2000) (―[A]cross the spectrum of regulatory activity, the OECD plays a distinctively important 
role.‖); Brauner, supra note 6, at 310 (identifying the OECD as the key source of international 
coordination); Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal ‗World Tax Organization‘ 
Through National Responses to E-commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 136 (2006) (same). 
For a list of OECD members, see OECD.org, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649_34483_1889402_1_1_ 1_1,00.html (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2009).  
 8. See OECD.org, About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_ 36734103_ 
1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009). The OECD facilitates public/private collaboration 
both internally, by coordinating working groups with government and nongovernmental participants, 
and externally, by mobilizing nongovernmental networks such as the International Fiscal Association 
(―IFA‖), a professional networking organization with a membership of approximately 11,500 
accountants, lawyers, economists, business advocates, academics, and other interested parties. See 
IFA.nl, IFA Members, http://www.ifa.nl/index.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (IFA membership list 
available only to subscribing members). 
 9. CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION, OECD, THE OECD‘S CURRENT TAX 
AGENDA 74–75 (Sept. 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter CURRENT TAX AGENDA].  
 10. For example, the OECD‘s development of widely used model tax treaties and interpretive 
commentaries has prompted an ongoing debate about the legal status of these documents. See, e.g., 
Michael Lang & Florian Brugger, The Role of the OECD Commentary in Tax Treaty Interpretation, 23 
AUSTL. TAX FORUM 95 (2008); Frank Engelen, Some Observations on the Legal Status of the 
Commentaries on the OECD Model, 60 BULL. FOR INT‘L TAX‘N 105 (2006); David R. Tillinghast, 
Commentaries to the OECD Model Convention: Ubiquitous, Often Controversial; But Could They 
Possibly Be Legally Binding?, 35 TAX MGMT. INT‘L J. 580 (2006); REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/2
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cooperation and national autonomy. Part II analyzes the emergence of 
network-based tax policy collaboration and argues that early decisions 
against multilateralism led to the soft global tax governance structure 
supported by the OECD today. Part III analyzes how the OECD network 
facilitates tax policy coordination, first by examining how the OECD 
―works‖ in terms of its institutional structure and processes, and second by 
showing how lawmakers in the United States use this soft governance 
structure as the intellectual foundation, the benchmark, and the impetus for 
national tax law reform. Part IV examines some of the implications of 
network- and norm-based tax governance and concludes that this approach 
presents serious challenges for monitoring the autonomy/cooperation 
tradeoff. Part V concludes. 
II. WHY TAX POLICY DEVELOPS IN NETWORKS 
Legal scholarship has only recently begun to recognize the 
characteristics of international income tax governance as a unique 
institutional infrastructure, but the history of this infrastructure dates back 
over almost a century. We may effectively trace a path from today‘s 
network-based, soft tax governance structure back to the efforts of a few 
tax policymakers in the early twentieth century who convened in the 
world‘s first transnational networks to resolve issues arising from the 
widespread adoption of modern income taxation. The structures these 
individuals created to navigate their shared concerns endures in the soft 
governance structure that develops global tax policy norms today. This 
part explores the historical issues that led policymakers to seek 
transnational cooperation, the factors that led them to use transnational 
networks as the optimal means of cultivating such cooperation, and the 
ultimate irresolution that resulted from their approach. 
A. Collision of National Tax Bases 
Like trade taxation, income taxation requires significant transnational 
cooperation, principally because nations tend to define income in ways 
that virtually guarantee overlap with other national definitions.
11
 The 
United States was one of the first nations to adopt a tax regime that 
 
 
 11. For example, the United States defines gross income as ―income from whatever source 
derived,‖ which includes income earned in foreign jurisdictions. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006). The result is 
―double taxation,‖ which is seen to make operating abroad potentially very expensive, curtailing the 
potential for foreign export- and investment-led growth. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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calculated liability based on income derived by its residents from all 
sources, whether domestic or foreign.
12
 The nation quickly confronted the 
concern that U.S. residents earning profits abroad might also be taxed by 
foreign governments, resulting in double taxation. This would especially 
affect American exporters at a time when exported goods were the primary 
force driving the U.S. economy. In response, the U.S. Congress adopted 
legislation allowing for a deduction from income for foreign taxes paid.
13
  
However, as tax rates rose and international commercial activity 
increased exponentially over the course of World War I, the tax deduction 
came to be seen as inadequate.
14
 Apparently on the advice of a single tax 
expert,
15
 Congress responded by allowing taxpayers to have a dollar-for-
dollar credit, rather than a mere deduction, for taxes paid to foreign 
jurisdictions.
16
 The United States was the first country to provide this kind 
of comprehensive foreign tax credit.
17
 Under the new rule, although the 
United States nominally imposed taxation on its residents regardless of 
where the income was earned, the credit reduced or eliminated U.S. taxes 
to the extent foreign taxes were paid. Since the United States would only 
impose tax to the extent another country did not, the new rule made it 
 
 
 12. Modern income taxation in the United States emerged on the strength of the newly adopted 
Sixteenth Amendment, which gave Congress broad power to tax income ―from whatever source 
derived.‖ U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.  
 13. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIB, 38 Stat. 114, 167–68 (1913).  
 14. See ELISABETH A. OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT 20 (―It appears that the foreign tax 
credit provisions were adopted . . . in response to the sharp increase in income tax rates both at home 
and abroad during World War I.‖). The deduction was a partial solution since it was not a dollar-for-
dollar offset of the foreign taxation, but rather a reduction of the amount of income subject to U.S. 
taxation. The foreign tax credit was enacted within five years of the 1913 Act and was limited to 
―income, war-profits, and excess-profits taxes.‖ See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, §§ 222(a), 238(a), 
40 Stat. 1057, 1073, 1080 (1919). 
 15. Namely, T. S. Adams. Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O‘Hear, The ―Original Intent‖ of 
U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1027–30. 
 16. H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 10 (1918). The difference in value between a credit and a deduction 
is significant. A deduction reduces the taxpayers‘ income which is subject to tax, so that the value of 
the deduction to the taxpayer is a function of the applicable tax rate, while the value of the credit is its 
nominal value (so long as it is not limited). To take a simple example, if a taxpayer subject to a 35% 
tax rate earns $100, she would incur a tax of $35. If she was entitled to a $20 tax deduction, she would 
subtract $20 from her taxable income and calculate her 35% tax on $80 instead, yielding a tax due of 
$28, and a savings of $7. On the other hand, if she was entitled to a $20 tax credit, she would not 
subtract that amount from her taxable income but instead would subtract it directly from her tax due, 
thus reducing her tax to $15.  
 17. See OWENS, supra note 14, at 20 (―While one or two countries had used the tax credit device 
prior to [the United States] for taxes paid to their colonies, the United States was the first country to 
apply the foreign tax credit on a world-wide basis as a means of relieving international double taxation 
of income.‖); see also Graetz & O‘Hear, supra note 15, at 1022; H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. 
Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 359, 361 
(1981).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/2
  
 
 
 
 
2010] NETWORKS, NORMS, AND NATIONAL TAX POLICY 7 
 
 
 
 
profitable for other nations to impose creditable taxes on income earned by 
U.S. investors in their jurisdictions.
18
 The U.S. regime was therefore seen 
as ―making a present of the revenue to other countries.‖19  
In stark contrast to the generosity of the U.S. foreign tax credit, most 
other countries did not unilaterally address the problem of overlapping 
income taxation at this time.
20
 For example, Britain imposed worldwide 
taxation, but provided only a partial foreign tax credit against income 
derived within its empire.
21
 As a result, Britain collected taxation on both 
its own investors who earned income abroad and, aided by the U.S. 
foreign credit, American investors who earned income in Britain.  
The United States and Britain thus fundamentally conflicted over the 
issue of which country should cede its right to tax. The United States 
sought an international regime in which the country where income was 
earned (the source, or host country) had the primary right of taxation. 
Conversely, Britain sought an international regime in which primary tax 
rights would fall to the country that provided the investment capital (the 
residence, or home country). The two positions could not be reconciled 
with a compromise: rather, one view or the other must necessarily prevail. 
Moreover, as more countries adopted similar tax systems, the problem was 
becoming sufficiently prevalent that unilateral and bilateral solutions 
would be futile. With a growing number of nations aligning along the 
polarized U.S. and British positions, the desire to craft a mutually 
agreeable solution prompted the emergence of the first transnational tax 
networks. These early networks featured first interest groups, then experts, 
and finally government officials as countries navigated a workable 
approach to coordinating tax policy across national borders. 
B. Early Networks: Interest Groups, Experts, and Officials 
The newly formed International Chamber of Commerce (―ICC‖), a 
non-governmental interest group of business executives, was the first 
 
 
 18. The foreign tax would not impede U.S. investors because they would pay the same level of 
tax as if they invested at home, but the tax credit ensured that the foreign jurisdictions would always 
collect the revenue. See RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
190 (2d ed. 1996) (―Neutrality depends on who pays what tax, not which government collects it.‖). 
 19. EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL FISCAL COOPERATION 
135 (1928).  
 20. At the time, many countries such as France and the Netherlands did not tax the foreign 
income of their residents. For other countries, double taxation may not have been seen as a practical 
problem until the late nineteenth century, owing to their relatively low rates of taxation and 
international commercial activity. See Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 17, at 361. 
 21. See Graetz & O‘Hear, supra note 15, at 1046.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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institution to create a transnational space for debating tax policy.
22
 The 
ICC brought together ―responsible business leaders‖ from the United 
States, Britain, and several other countries to collaborate on common 
issues of interest, including possible solutions to the problem of double 
taxation.
23
 The identities of the particular individuals who worked in the 
ICC seem to be lost to history,
24
 but they were linked by an ―overriding 
aim that remains unchanged: to serve world business by promoting trade 
and investment, open markets for goods and services, and the free flow of 
capital.‖25 The ICC was, and is, an interest group, serving the needs of its 
private sector members, and not a forum for coordination among 
government officials or lawmakers. But the ICC provided lawmakers a 
service by creating the first forum for aggregating views across countries 
and building consensus over the divisive issue of jurisdictional primacy.
26
 
As business leaders were mobilizing within the ICC, a major shift in 
international relations resulting from World War I brought into being the 
League of Nations, a diplomatic intergovernmental network that became 
an alternative and distinct site for transnational tax policy development. 
The original organizers have described the League of Nations as ―the 
biggest world union ever brought about‖ and ―the most ambitious political 
move ever attempted.‖27 The League was a product of the Treaty of 
Versailles, which sought to control conflict and promote peace between 
states.
28
 Unlike the ICC with its private sector interest-group focus, the 
 
 
 22. The ICC was organized in 1919 with members from Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, and the 
United States. See What is ICC?, http://www.iccwbo.org/id93/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
 23. See ICC 90 Anniversary, http://www.icc90anniversary.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) 
(stating that the organization was founded ―by responsible business leaders who believed that 
international trade provided a path to peace and prosperity [and who] called themselves ‗merchants of 
peace‘‖).  
 24. See, e.g., Lara Friedlander & Scott Wilkie, Policy Forum: The History of Tax Treaty 
Provisions—And Why It Is Important to Know About It, 54 CAN. TAX J. 907 (2006). 
 25. See What is ICC?, supra note 22. 
 26. The ICC adopted an initial resolution that the taxing jurisdiction should turn on the nature of 
the tax, with distinctions being made between ―super‖ and ―normal‖ taxes. Exceptions were made for 
particular kinds of income, including that from international shipping (as to which residence-based 
taxation was to be preserved) and that from sales of manufactured goods (to be apportioned under 
formula). However, the United States rejected this approach, in favor of a system that would favor the 
source jurisdiction, as its credit system did. Id. The ICC ultimately came to a consensus in 1923, when 
it issued a new resolution on jurisdictional primacy. 
 27. See Foreword, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS STARTS: AN OUTLINE BY ITS ORGANISERS, at v–vi 
(1920) (describing the League as ―a cooperative association where the nations seek to overcome their 
mutual differences‖); Raymond B. Fosdick, The Structure of the League, in THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
STARTS: AN OUTLINE BY ITS ORGANISERS 6 (1920). 
 28. Preamble, The Covenant of the League of Nations, June 1919, available at http://avalon. 
law.yale.edu/imt/parti.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) (undertaking the parties ―to promote international 
co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss1/2
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League of Nations provided a means of facilitating transnational 
cooperation by creating a new institutional space and mechanism for 
technical experts and national officials of varying diplomatic status to 
exchange knowledge and perspectives.
29
 The League was expected to 
afford ―authoritative channels for the use of scientific and expert 
knowledge in the interest not of any one Power, but of the solution of the 
problems themselves.‖30 As one of the League‘s organizers expressed it, 
the League was viewed as a remedy for a world in which diplomatic and 
bureaucratic processes had hampered rather than promoted international 
cooperation in matters of vital worldwide importance, including in the 
field of economics and financial regulation.
31
 In this view, the League‘s 
main function was to correct an existing international political 
malfunction, by creating a decision-making structure that focused on 
coordination as primarily a matter of collaborative technical problem 
solving rather than primarily a matter of diplomatic relationships.
32
 
The League quickly identified tax policy as a primary focus, and set in 
motion the desired technical problem solving. At a 1920 meeting in 
Brussels, the delegates declared that double taxation was a serious 
impediment to international relations and world production, and therefore 
a threat to global peace.
33
 To address this threat, the League of Nations 
 
 
resort to war by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations by the firm 
establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among 
Governments‖). The United States was not a member of the League of Nations because the Senate 
refused its consent to ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, a failure that has been described as ―the 
fuse which exploded twenty years later in the century‘s second catastrophic global conflict.‖ Peter J. 
Spiro, Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961, 969 (―Many 
believed this failure—and the resulting interwar isolation of the United States, including its non-
participation in the League of Nations—[lit this fuse.]‖). Immediately upon ratifying the Treaty of 
Versailles, the United States would have been entitled to a seat on the League of Nations Council, 
which was described at the time as comparable to ―the Cabinet of a Nation‖ and ―the principal seat of 
power of the great nations.‖ Fosdick, supra note 27, at 7, 11. Nevertheless, the United States did 
participate in League activity: U.S. experts served technical and administrative functions in the League 
Secretariat. Id. at 15–16. 
 29. Fosdick, supra note 27, at 12–13 (During early League Sessions, most of the national 
representatives were ambassadors and cabinet members, while a few countries were represented by 
their heads of state.).  
 30. J. T. Shotwell, First Pages from the History of the League of Nations, in THE LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS STARTS: AN OUTLINE BY ITS ORGANISERS 46, 50 (1920). 
 31. Id. at 49 (describing the League‘s reliance on technical expertise ―in fields where purely 
political machinery tends to hamper rather than promote‖ cooperation). 
 32. See generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
 33. League of Nations, Econ. & Fin. Comm‘n, Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the 
Financial Comm., by Profs. Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp League of Nations Doc. 
E.F.S.73 F.19 (1923) [hereinafter Rpt. of Bruins et al.]. 
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used the prior work of the ICC as a basis for its initial discussions.
34
 But 
the League did not simply defer to the ICC. Instead, it formed its own 
financial committee with the purpose of collaborating and producing a 
report on the best approach to the technical problem of double taxation.
35
 
The financial committee enlisted the intellectual input of a team of four 
respected economists from four nations: Professors Gijsbert W. J. Bruins 
of the Netherlands, Luigi Einaudi of Italy, Edwin R. A. Seligman of the 
United States, and Sir Josiah Stamp of the United Kingdom.
36
  
These individuals were chosen for their respective reputations as public 
finance, economics, and tax experts, as well as for their national 
affiliations. Bruins was a monetary expert who later served as a League of 
Nations commissioner and as a technical advisor to Austria.
37
 Einaudi was 
a noted economist and editor of the Review of Economic History who later 
served as the governor of the Bank of Italy, premier and minister of the 
budget, and finally, President of Italy.
38
 Edwin R. A. Seligman was a 
public finance, economics, and tax expert, one of the founders of the 
American Economic Association,
39
 and the author of several prominent 
(now classic) articles and books on taxation.
40
 Finally, Sir Josiah Stamp 
was a leading British economist and tax expert, who served on both 
Britain‘s Royal Commission on Income Tax and its Economic Advisory 
Council, as well as holding such high-ranking positions as Assistant 
Secretary of Britain‘s Inland Revenue and Director of the Bank of 
England.
41
 These experts were expected to bring about a neutral, objective, 
even scientific solution to the articulated problem of double taxation. As 
such, the League‘s structure as an intergovernmental network may have 
enjoyed a legitimacy advantage over its then available alternatives for 
global tax coordination: diplomatic relations between states on one hand, 
 
 
 34. See Graetz & O‘Hear, supra note 15, at 1067–70 (suggesting that language in reports 
produced under the ICC‘s collaborative efforts resurfaced in League of Nations discussions). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See Rpt. of Bruins et al., supra note 33. 
 37. GIANNI TONIOLO, CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION AT THE BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS, 1930–1973, at 93 (2005). 
 38. Einaudi, Luigi, in COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 876 (6th ed. 2000); Einaudi, Luigi, in 
BRITANNICA CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA (2006), available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/181310/Luigi-Einaudi. 
 39. Seligman, in LYMAN ABBOTT ET AL., 10 NATIONAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 49 (James T. White & Company 1899). 
 40. See, e.g., EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ON THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION (1892); 
EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1894); EDWIN R. A. 
SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION (1895); EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX (1911); Edwin 
R. A. Seligman, The Cost of the War and How It Was Met, 9 AM. ECON. REV. 739 (1919).  
 41. J. HARRY JONES, JOSIAH STAMP PUBLIC SERVANT (1964). 
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and the interest-based policymaking structure of the ICC on the other.
42
 
The network was viewed as a viable means of meeting worldwide public 
welfare goals by ―arriving at policies in the technical or limited fields in 
which they operate‖ without ―infringing upon the principle of national 
sovereignty.‖43  
The approach of the experts reflected the tension between the desire to 
problem-solve through expertise and the need to respect sovereign 
autonomy that contextualized their task. These noted and prominent 
economists asked themselves, ―Can a remedy be found, or to what extent 
can a remedy be found, in an amendment of the taxation system of each 
individual country, independently of any international agreement?‖44 
Posing the question in this manner suggests that these experts were not 
solely focused on finding a technically correct solution, but understood 
that any proposed solution would have to meet political goals. In assuming 
away a multilateral agreement, the experts reflected their expectation that 
states would only agree to coordinate tax policy through aligned, but 
voluntary and unilateral, state action rather than delegation of authority to 
a single supranational authority. Even so, each of the authors‘ suggested 
methods of addressing double taxation would have required some person 
or institution to set uniform standards for adoption by individual states.
45
 
The authors suggested that states could claim the primary right to tax 
based on either the residence of the taxpayer or the economic source of the 
income; alternatively, states could apportion income among competing 
jurisdictions based on some predetermined formula, or they could agree to 
classify income by type and assign the primary right to tax accordingly.
46
  
The solutions devised by the experts were inherently transnational in 
scope. States could choose to acquiesce to a particular standard on a 
unilateral basis, by legislating accordingly, but cooperation could only be 
achieved if states chose and implemented the same uniform strategy. For 
example, states could uniformly implement residence-based jurisdictional 
primacy by (universally) exempting income earned within their 
jurisdictions by foreign persons, and by taxing their own residents on 
income from all sources. Conversely, states could uniformly implement 
 
 
 42. For example, one of the original League organizers posited that the League‘s strength lay in 
its ability to prevent ―matters which are primarily technical or economic‖ from acquiring ―a political 
complexion‖ or ―the colour of political controversies,‖ without leaving these matters ―to the relative 
secrecy which is inherent in bureaucratic action.‖ Shotwell, supra note 30, at 55.  
 43. Shotwell, supra note 30, at 56. 
 44. Rpt. of Bruins et al., supra note 33, at 3.  
 45. Id. at 40–42. 
 46. Id.  
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source-based jurisdictional primacy by (universally) taxing income earned 
within their jurisdictions by foreign persons, and by implementing U.S.-
style foreign tax credits for foreign-source income earned by their 
residents. Neither solution would coordinate tax policy, however, unless 
countries adopted and implemented the same strategy in the same way. 
The report was silent on the details of how those choices would be 
negotiated and policed. 
The expert consultation left unanswered the basic question of how to 
achieve coordination: for that, the Financial Committee determined that 
―they needed not only the opinions of experts but also those of the 
representatives of ‗certain (European) governments.‘‖47 The committee 
hoped that these representatives would ―discuss the possibility of an 
agreement to enable common action to be taken upon certain points, and 
. . . permit the drawing up of schemes, bilateral agreements and other 
arrangements concerning double taxation and the evasion of taxation.‖48 
The Financial Committee therefore convened an intergovernmental 
committee of high-level officials from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, 
Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland to produce a second 
report.
49
  
These national officials, linked by common purpose, expertise, and 
national affiliation, determined that double taxation could only be solved if 
countries either adopted common rules via their individual legislative 
processes or agreed on universal standards in the context of a treaty or 
series of treaties.
50
 In a rhetorical move that would resonate for decades to 
follow, and which continues to challenge tax policy-making today, these 
experts expressed a preference for bilateral treaties not as a first and best 
choice, but primarily to protect the sovereign right of each country to 
 
 
 47. Id. at 3. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (listing the affiliations as follows: Belgium‘s Director-General of Direct Taxation, 
Czechoslovakia‘s Head of Department at the Ministry of Finance, France‘s Director-General of Direct 
Taxation, Britain‘s Deputy-Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue, Italy‘s Director-General of 
Direct Taxation, Holland‘s Director-General of Direct Taxation, Customs and Excise, and 
Switzerland‘s Director of the Federal Taxation Department). 
 50.   
It should therefore be understood that the recommendations on which we have agreed and 
which are set out in the following pages will be of no practical value unless the League of 
Nations adopts them, and unless the various countries themselves, in the free exercise of their 
sovereign powers, recognise them and obtain parliamentary approval for the laws and 
conventions which they will necessitate. 
Id. at 6. 
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impose taxation at their own discretion.
51
 With no ready supranational 
authority to take control, it was apparent that someone would have to set 
standards, but not as clear how that would, or could, be accomplished 
without violating sovereign autonomy.  
C. Resolution: To Remain Unresolved 
The League‘s financial committee attempted to synthesize the issues 
raised in the two reports they had commissioned, but could not reach 
consensus. The committee therefore drew up a series of model treaties to 
serve as templates for bilateral treaties to be negotiated on a case by case 
basis among its member countries.
52
 The model format was intended to 
produce universal standards over time, with the idea that multiple treaties 
built upon a structurally similar framework would converge into a single 
multilateral treaty, producing uniformity in international fiscal law even 
without a supranational authority to issue substantive rules.
53
 The 
committee expressed its hope that its series of model tax treaties would 
eventually ―make possible the unification and codification of the rules 
previously laid down‖ in a single, binding, multilateral tax convention.54 
Eight decades after this hope was first expressed, thousands of bilateral tax 
treaties, as well as thousands of protocols, amendments, memoranda of 
understanding, and side agreements are in force. But no single, binding, 
multilateral income tax agreement has emerged. 
Instead of moving states incrementally toward such a multilateral 
treaty, the model format effectively entrenched a reliance on political 
cooperation, perhaps even soft law, to resolve common tax governance 
problems. The work of the League of Nations set in place a specific format 
for global tax policy coordination that involved continuous interaction 
between government officials, experts, and the private sector. The types of 
mechanisms these individuals chose—models, guidelines, and other ―soft‖ 
 
 
 51. Thus, the report recommended, ―[S]ome system of relief should be adopted, but does not, 
however, define the system. It expresses a desire . . . that more bilateral conventions should be 
concluded.‖ Id. at 8. Further, the experts stressed, ―[I]n drafting these resolutions, we have endeavored 
to avoid all interference with national sovereignty.‖ Id. at 26. The assumed importance of sovereignty 
is a convention that continues to present contradictions and challenges for domestic and transnational 
tax policy. See, e.g., Ring, supra note 3. 
 52. Report Presented by the Comm. of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, 
League of Nations Doc. C.216M.85 1927 II (1927) (prepared by The Comm. of Tech. Experts on 
Double Taxation and Tax Evasion).  
 53. Id. at 8 (proposing temporary tax coordination models that were expected to eventually lead 
to a single multilateral agreement).  
 54. Id. 
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methods of coordinating tax strategies—have become the mode by which 
tax norms are now developed and transmitted as international standards.
55
 
The ability to mobilize and meld the private and public sector in order to 
create norms endures as the primary source of global tax norms today, 
namely, the OECD.
56
  
III. HOW THE OECD DEVELOPS TAX POLICY NORMS 
The OECD took the lead as the main forum for transnational tax 
collaboration beginning in the early 1960s, and it is a critical focal point 
for exploring how global tax policy currently develops.
57
 The OECD 
Secretary General views the OECD as ―at the forefront of setting tax 
 
 
 55. I refer here both to the use of model treaties and accompanying commentaries, and to the 
more typical form of modeling by which one country‘s practices serve as guidance to others. Using 
models as a mechanism for diffusing global norms may be the most important form of globalization. 
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 7, at 546–47 (stating that while ―there is no master mechanism 
of globalization,‖ modeling may be the most consistently important because ―modeling works with a 
subtlety that is intriguing, and intriguingly connected to normative theories of global politics‖). 
Convergence has been achieved on a growing list of substantive tax law practices that originated in the 
United States and other key states, and modeling continues to be a principal factor in continuing and 
increasing this convergence. 
 56. The United Nations currently has a permanent tax policy committee, but to date the OECD 
has dominated the U.N. in terms of resources and personnel dedicated to tax policy matters. One 
important question that remains unanswered here is why the United Nations, which was the successor 
institution to the League of Nations, did not continue the tax work undertaken by the League‘s 
Financial Committee. Its failure to do so left a gap that was later filled by the OECD, a relatively much 
less representative body (at least in terms of global population). When the U.N. finally did begin to 
turn to tax matters, in response to concerns about the inappropriateness of OECD tax treaty standards 
to the developing world, the OECD had already positioned itself as the central institution for tax policy 
matters, and the U.N.‘s efforts were seen by many as largely duplicative. For a discussion, see Allison 
Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study, 71 BROOK. L. 
REV. 639 (2005). 
 57. The OECD describes itself as a standard-setter in ―the international tax world.‖ CURRENT 
TAX AGENDA, supra note 9, at 5. Each year, national representatives who constitute the principal 
decision-making group in the OECD reaffirm their view that this institution plays a critical role in 
developing policy in a globalized world. See, e.g., Meeting of the Council at Ministerial Level, Paris, 
Fr., May 21–22, 1996, Communiqué, ¶ 14 (―Ministers conclude that the OECD is an essential 
component of the multilateral system . . . [with a] vital role . . . in reinforcing democracy and 
demonstrating the values and dynamism of the free market.‖). U.S. lawmakers, though sometimes 
ambivalent about the direction of particular OECD initiatives, nevertheless have described the 
institution as an appropriate forum for building consensus positions on tax policy and vital for 
achieving compliance with U.S. tax law. See, e.g., Margaret Milner Richardson, Comm‘r, Internal 
Revenue Serv., Remarks at the International Fiscal Association U.S.A. Branch Annual Meeting (Mar. 
2, 1995) (transcript available at http://www.unclefed.com/Tax-News/1995/Nr95-19.html) (―[A]ttaining 
international consensus on transfer pricing [through the OECD] is absolutely essential to appropriate 
compliance in the area.‖); Stuart E. Eizenstat, Deputy Sec‘y, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Remarks to 
the Tax Executives Institute Midyear Conference (Mar. 20, 2000) (transcript available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ls476.htm) (expressing support for use of the OECD to create 
consensus for taxation of e-commerce).  
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standards for the global economy.‖58 This intergovernmental institution is 
by no means the only place where transnational tax norms are currently 
emerging or can emerge. For instance, the United Nations has a working 
tax policy committee
59
 and international financial institutions, especially 
the International Monetary Fund, have had a significant influence on tax 
policy, particularly in developing countries, and particularly in the case of 
consumption taxation.
60
 In addition, interest group organizations, such as 
the ICC and the International Fiscal Association (―IFA‖), are also 
important tax networks. But the OECD occupies a historically significant 
role in tax policy development, and this institution is increasing in 
importance as economic globalization continues to present tax lawmakers 
with new and difficult challenges.
 
 
Yet the OECD is relatively understudied and, according to some 
OECD officials, misunderstood.
61
 To understand how the OECD‘s 
structure as a network impacts the way tax policy develops requires an 
understanding of its institutional design, the process by which it facilitates 
the transition from ideas to norms, and its role in assisting national 
lawmakers to achieve tax policy goals. The OECD provides much 
information about its institutional features on its website and in its reports, 
standards, and guidelines.
62
 But these documents do not convey how the 
OECD works in practice, and how nations use it to accomplish policy 
objectives.
63
 Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn from a 
 
 
 58. CURRENT TAX AGENDA, supra note 9, at 8. 
 59. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. of Experts on Int‘l Cooperation in 
Tax Matters, Report on the Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2008/6 (Oct. 20–24, 2008). 
 60. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least 
Developed Countries, 42 BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Miranda Stewart, Global 
Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 
HARV. INT‘L L.J. 139 (2003); Lisa Philipps & Miranda Stewart, Fiscal Transparency: Global Norms, 
Domestic Laws and the Politics of Budgets, 34 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 797 (2009); Miranda Stewart, Tax 
Policy Transfer to Developing Countries: Politics, Institutions and Experts, in GLOBAL DEBATES 
ABOUT TAXATION 182 (Holger Nehring & Florian Schui eds., 2007). 
 61. Interviews with several OECD officials suggest that these individuals perceive practitioners, 
academics, and politicians as either uninformed regarding how the OECD works and what it does, 
suspicious of the organization as a whole, or both. Interview with OECD Official, in Ottawa, Can. 
(June 2, 2008); Telephone Interview with OECD Official (Oct. 7, 2008); Telephone Interview with 
OECD Official (Nov. 25, 2008); Interview with OECD Official, in Brussels, Belg. (Aug. 31, 2008). 
For a consistent account based on personal experience in the institution, see James Salzman, 
Decentralized Administrative Law in the Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development, 
68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 189 (2005). 
 62. The OECD website is extensive and many of its publications are freely available for 
download. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.oecd.org (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2009). 
 63. Participant observation would be more revealing, but at least one participant has noted that 
even from the inside, network-based governance is difficult to understand and explain. See Salzman, 
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combination of the OECD‘s own publicly available resources, analysis 
undertaken by scholars regarding the OECD‘s role in developing tax 
policy (and the role of networks generally), and the accounts of individual 
OECD officials themselves about what they do and how they contribute to 
national law-making.
64
 This Part uses these resources to shed light on the 
integral role that transnational networks like the OECD play in developing 
tax policy.  
A. How Networking Works: The OECD‘s Institutional Structure 
One of the challenges of studying networks is their very nature—
sprawling, fluid, and dynamic; capable of rapid change in membership, 
venue, and configuration; and un-tethered to national bureaucratic 
structures.
65
 Perhaps as a result, relatively few scholars have specifically 
addressed the institutional or administrative aspects of the OECD: its 
internal structure is complex, inconsistent, and not well explained.
66
 ―Who 
does what‖ at the OECD varies widely based on the composition of 
committees, the types of issues being considered, and the role assumed by 
OECD employees (Secretariat) on a case-by-case basis. One OECD 
official suggested that the potential for confusion is high, not due to a 
desire for secrecy, but because the OECD‘s structure and operations are 
―quite complicated‖ and ―hard to understand from outside.‖67 
Nevertheless, the formal structure of the organization does give some 
clues about how this network works. 
The OECD is organized under a treaty that provides for some degree of 
supranational authority,
68
 but it is not typically viewed as an institution to 
which states delegate decision-making authority in order to harness ―real 
 
 
supra note 61 (discussing his observations from his unique position as participant-observer over ten 
years). 
 64. To collect these accounts, I have engaged in a series of interviews with current and former 
OECD officials as well as practitioners who have experience working with and within OECD 
committees. See supra note 61. In most cases, the subjects of these interviews have requested 
confidentiality. References herein reflect these requests. 
 65. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004). 
 66. The work by James Salzman is thus an important contribution. See Salzman, supra note 61. 
 67. Telephone Interview with OECD Official (Oct. 7, 2008), supra note 61 (―I don‘t think the 
OECD is particularly secretive. But it is quite complicated. It has a strange committee structure which 
is hard to understand from outside. You need to bear in mind it is consensus-based. All countries have 
to agree on working parties, money, declarations, determinations.‖). 
 68. The organizing document is the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Signed December 14, 1960 in Paris, which ―reconstituted‖ the former Organisation 
for European Economic Co-operation. Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Dec. 14, 1960, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_ 
34483_1915847_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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power.‖69 Instead of exercising centralized authority,70 OECD participants 
generally develop tax policy norms through collaborative consensus- 
building.
71
 Tax policy develops in three intersecting networks within the 
OECD structure: the OECD Council, the Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration (―CTPA‖), and the Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
(―CFA‖).72 Interested parties from member and non-member countries 
participate in each of these interrelated networks, either directly, by 
attending committee meetings and conferences, or indirectly, by 
interacting with participants in other formal and informal settings. Much 
of the work ―goes on in countless little technical committees,‖ but 
collectively these committees are incrementally constructing legal 
regimes.
73
 
1. Diplomatic Network: The OECD Council 
The OECD Council is a network for high-level diplomats. The 
members of the Council are ministers of finance, economy, trade, and 
foreign affairs; secretaries of state; and trade commissioners.
74
 The 
Council creates a transnational space for these high-ranking national 
officials to aggregate their agendas, including those on tax policy, by 
disseminating official statements under the auspices of the institution.
75
 As 
a body, these officials issue consensus
76
 positions in the form of 
statements, reports, recommendations, standards, models, and, less 
frequently, in the form of formal international agreements.
77
 In each case, 
 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 65. 
 71. See OECD.org, What We Do and How, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_ 
36761681_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
 72. See OECD.org, Who Does What?, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_ 
36761791_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
 73. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 7, at 503. 
 74. For the 2008 meeting, the United States was represented by Ambassador Susan Schwab, 
Trade Representative; Dr. Edward P. Lazear, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors; Ambassador 
Peter Allgeier, Deputy Trade Representative, Executive Office of the President; Mr. Reuben Jeffery 
III, Under Secretary for Economic, Energy and Agricultural Affairs, State Department; and Dr. Joseph 
Glauber, Special Doha Agricultural Envoy, Department of Agriculture. OECD.org, Meeting of the 
OECD Council at Ministerial Level 2008: Who‘s Who, http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_ 
21571361_40155017_40466057_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
 75. OECD member countries prefer not to have their individual contributions ―out in the public 
domain. They want to see the OECD as a body, exerting combined activity by all OECD countries, a 
unified front.‖ Telephone Interview with OECD Official (Oct. 7, 2008), supra note 61.  
 76. At least this was the case until 2006—the OECD Council now operates by ―Qualified 
Majority Voting‖ pursuant to governance changes adopted in 2006. See OECD, ANNUAL REPORT 
2007, at 106 (2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/33/38528123.pdf. 
 77. For example, the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters is a 
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the substance of these documents and statements are forged from 
negotiation and collaboration within designated groups and committees 
that are organized by OECD staff. In the area of taxation, the statements 
and documents are typically drafted by OECD staff members,
78
 and they 
are typically released without attribution to any particular state.
79
 
High-level diplomats use the Council to direct particular projects to 
various subcommittees of lower-level government officials. As national 
representatives, the members of this network serve as the primary conduits 
for interaction between sovereign nations. Their function in the OECD is 
simply one aspect of their national roles, and tax policy is just one of many 
issues in which they have an interest or for which they have responsibility. 
For example, the United States is represented in the OECD Council by the 
U.S. Trade Representative and the Chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisors.
80
 The practical job of the OECD Council, then, is not so much to 
make policy itself, but to mobilize policy development by mandating the 
OECD staff to organize and direct committees and subcommittees, and by 
ultimately reviewing and signing on to the consensus positions forged 
within these sub-networks. 
2. Expert Network: The CTPA 
The OECD staff—its Secretariat—mobilizes projects around the goals 
articulated by the Council. Secretariat staffers gather government officials 
and experts from the member countries, as well as observers from non-
member countries in some cases, to negotiate a common position in 
 
 
multilateral treaty which several—but not all—of the OECD members have signed and ratified. The 
United States ratified this treaty in 1990. See Legislative Actions on Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.html (search 
―Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,‖ then follow hyperlink ―Treaty 
Number 101–6‖).  
 78. One OECD staffer stated that the input of the Secretariat varied according to committee and 
subject matter, but that in tax matters, the Secretariat was typically quite involved in coordinating and 
authoring committee documents. Interview with OECD Official (June 2, 2008), supra note 61.  
 79. In some cases, an OECD report or statement may include an individual state‘s opposition to a 
particular policy. However, since the OECD asserts its policy to be the product of unanimity and 
consensus, particular statements are not typically ascribed to one country or another. See discussion 
accompanying supra note 67. 
 80. National actors have been described as locked within a ―complex interdependency‖ that 
transcends particular subject areas and engenders consistent cooperation. ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH 
NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 24–29 (1977). An inquiry 
regarding how deliberation occurs within the OECD is therefore simultaneously an inquiry about 
whether and how U.S. tax policy positions transmit globally through the structure of the OECD. 
Inconsistency in U.S. policy regarding the OECD harmful tax practices efforts might provide some 
insights here, but the details of these policy inconsistencies are not well documented.  
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Council-mandated projects. The department of the Secretariat that directs 
the OECD‘s work on tax matters is the Centre for Tax Policy and 
Administration. CTPA staffers are nationals from the United States and 
the other member countries who are employed by the OECD to organize 
and coordinate tax policy development among the member countries.
81
 
The CTPA describes itself as ―economists, scientists, lawyers, and other 
professional staff [who] work in Paris.‖82 This thin description fails to 
emphasize that these are experts in their fields who are chosen on the basis 
of their national reputations, experience, and technical knowledge, much 
like their predecessors in the League of Nations. 
Accordingly, the CTPA is also a transnational network of tax 
professionals. Most CTPA staffers are hired at the OECD after serving as 
senior tax officials in their home governments, and most have had 
experience as member-country representatives on OECD committees.
83
 
OECD staffers are sometimes referred to as international civil servants, 
but they are not public servants. Rather, they are employees of the OECD 
who carry out their work not as national representatives, but in their 
personal capacity. However, their former affiliation with particular nations 
is an important factor in shaping their perspectives. As one commentator 
noted:  
I am sure [CTPA staffers] perceive themselves as neutral but, in 
fact, they almost always have come from long careers with national 
governments and have absorbed (and often been instrumental in 
forming) the institutional memory and mindset of their 
governments. When they come to Paris, they are free from dealing 
with short-term crises and policy decisions but I doubt very much 
they stray much from the institutional flight plan. This is 
particularly true because the civil servants tend to have their own 
long-term viewpoint and plan which does not necessarily coincide 
 
 
 81. OECD.org, Job Vacancies: Who Can Apply and How to Apply to the OECD, http://www. 
oecd.org/document/49/0,3343,en_21571361_34950072_40802801_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 
22, 2009). 
 82. CURRENT TAX AGENDA, supra note 9, at 4; see also OECD.org, Who Does What, 
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761791_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb 22, 
2009). Some OECD officials, including at least one U.S. national, work in an ―OECD Centre‖ in 
another country. OECD Centres are described as ―regional contacts for . . . OECD activities, from the 
sales of publications, to inquiries from the media, to liaison with governments, parliaments, business, 
labour and civil society,‖ which ―help disseminate information regarding OECD activities, and serve 
to communicate priorities from member countries‘ capitals to OECD headquarters.‖ See OECD.org, 
OECD Centres, http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3343,en_2649_201185_2663871_1_1_1_1,00. 
html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). 
 83. Interview with OECD Official (June 2, 2008), supra note 61.  
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with that of their political masters at any particular point in time. It 
is that long-term view that I think they bring with them to the 
OECD. In the short run, it may not be identical to that of the 
government they come from, but long-term they will reflect the 
thinking of their long-time friends and colleagues.
84
  
By working together on various committees, or otherwise interacting in 
the halls of the OECD offices in Paris and elsewhere, the CTPA creates a 
transnational legal space in which these former national representatives 
can apply their expertise and experience to OECD projects. The type and 
degree of collaboration and norm development that occur within this 
network are undocumented and perhaps cannot be documented except by 
someone within the network.
85
 However, consistent with other bodies that 
engage in collaborative problem-solving and decision-making, it is likely 
that some of the mechanisms observed in other regulatory areas are 
duplicated here. For example, we might expect to see reciprocal 
adjustments (compromises made when individuals with aligned interests 
seek a rules-based outcome to a common problem), as well as non-
reciprocal coordination (compromises that occur when individuals do not 
have aligned interests, but seek alliances for mutual benefit) and capacity-
building (helping individuals get technical assistance to implement global 
standards).
86
 Just as in any other legislative setting, these collaborative 
mechanisms impact the substance of the consensus positions reached by 
the OECD. 
The CTPA also creates collaborative venues by convening and 
participating in other transnational and regional networks. These include 
conferences and meetings involving individual countries, regional groups 
of countries,
87
 other transnational governmental organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, and international professional 
associations.
88
 But within the OECD itself, the CTPA‘s main function is to 
 
 
 84. E-mail from law firm partner, Toronto, Ont., to Allison Christians (Jan. 26, 2009, 12:36:35 
CST) (on file with author). 
 85. Reflective commentary by such insiders is therefore a welcome contribution to the scholarly 
literature. See, e.g., Salzman, supra note 61; Hugh Ault, Reflections on the Role of the OECD in 
Developing International Tax Norms, 34 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 757 (2009).  
 86. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 7, at 20–26, 543–49. 
 87. For example, the Unit for Cooperation with Non-OECD Economies, a subgroup of the 
CTPA, organizes some sixty conferences per year at which experts from OECD member countries 
meet with tax officials from non-member countries in order to ―share practical experience and 
expertise.‖ See OECD.org, Taxation in the Global Context: Developing our Co-operation with Non-
OECD Economies, http://www.oecd.org/document/2/0,3343,en_2649_34897_40603330_1_1_1_1,00. 
html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).  
 88. For example, the OECD uses meetings of the International Fiscal Association as a forum for 
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coordinate and manage another transnational network: the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs.  
3. Public/Private Network: The CFA 
The Committee on Fiscal Affairs is where the ―work‖ of transnational 
networking—meeting, negotiating, comparing, drafting, and 
compromising—takes place. The CFA is an umbrella committee under 
which there are currently five ―Working Parties,‖ two ―Forums,‖ and at 
least two ―ad hoc groups.‖89 The task of these committees is ―to advance 
ideas and review progress in specific policy areas,‖ as determined and 
defined by the OECD Council.
90
 To accomplish this, the CFA ―brings 
together senior tax officials from all OECD member countries,‖91—
typically treaty negotiators, policy advisors, and auditors
92—to collaborate 
with experts, most of whom are from member and observer countries.
93
 
The identity of the experts is not easily accessible, as it varies across issue 
areas and venues, but at least some of these individuals are well known as 
a result of their prominence in public settings or their contributions to tax 
literature.
94
 
Unlike the diplomatic and expert networks of the OECD Council and 
Secretariat, whose members are current and former national 
representatives, the CFA network is a potentially more inclusive 
network.
95
 Thus, ―[w]hile most of the Committee‘s work is undertaken by 
 
 
dialogue and dissemination of OECD policy. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, OECD Officials Make 
Annual Visit to IFA World Congress, 2005 Tax Notes Today (Tax Analysts) 184–86 (Sept. 23, 2005). 
 89. CURRENT TAX AGENDA, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
 90. In the OECD structure, the CFA is one of two hundred committees that are served by, and 
report their work-product to, the Secretariat. See OECD.org, Who Does What, supra note 82.  
 91. CURRENT TAX AGENDA, supra note 9, at 5. 
 92. Interview with OECD Official (June 2, 2008), supra note 61. 
 93. CURRENT TAX AGENDA, supra note 9, at 5 (―[W]ork . . . is carried out by groups of experts 
drawn from member and observer countries as well as other non-member economies in certain 
cases.‖).  
 94. For example, Professor Hugh Ault, a Senior Advisor to the CTPA, is well known for his 
contributions to policy-making through the OECD as a result of his extensive scholarly writings. See, 
e.g., Hugh J. Ault, Tax Competition: What (If Anything) To Do About It?, in INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE TAXATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KLAUS VOGEL 1 (Paul Kirchhof et al. eds., 2002); 
Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and 
Its Economic Premises (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3056, 1989); Hugh J. 
Ault, The Importance of International Cooperation in Forging Tax Policy, 26 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 1693 
(2001).  
 95. In the past decade the OECD has attempted to include a broader range of what they call 
―stakeholders,‖ i.e., international civil society organizations. See OECD.org, Civil Society, 
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34495_1_1_1_1_1,00. html (last visited Feb. 22, 
2009). 
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government officials and the OECD Secretariat,‖ CFA participation 
extends beyond country representatives to representatives of business and 
trade unions, as well as officials and experts from certain non-member 
countries on occasion.
96
 The Business and Industry (―BIAC‖) and Trade 
Union Advisory Committees (―TUAC‖) to the OECD are two professional 
networks that were created for this express purpose.
97
 The CFA also 
convenes ―groups and round-tables‖ for business and government officials 
to interact on a regular basis.
98
 In a more recent attempt to integrate the 
opinions and efforts of business and government in developing tax policy 
norms, the CFA now ―seek[s] the input of business through the publication 
of consultation drafts on our website.‖99 
These tax policy groups form an intertwined epistemic community that 
holds an important and influential position in the law-making order.
100
 
Together, the CTPA (OECD employees) and the CFA (public servants or 
national representatives) diagnose and prescribe tax policy reforms that are 
informed by, and that play out within, national legal regimes.
101
 This 
iterative process occurs through new-governance style mechanisms, such 
as reflexive and open coordination and dissemination through persuasion 
and pressure, rather than traditional command-and-control regulation.
102
 
 
 
 96. CURRENT TAX AGENDA, supra 9, at 7. 
 97. See BIAC.org, The Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, 
http://www.biac.org (last visited Feb. 22, 2009); TUAC.org, Trade Union Advisory Committee to the 
OECD, http://www.tuac.org/en/public/index.phtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2009). The BIAC ―plays a 
significant role across all domains in filtering business views to the OECD.‖ BRAITHWAITE & 
DRAHOS, supra note 7, at 488. In tax policy, however, BIAC appears to play a particularly significant 
role. The intersecting memberships of professional associations such as the BIAC, the ICC, and the 
International Fiscal Association, while beyond the scope of this Article, might help shed light on the 
constituents of global tax governance.  
 98. CURRENT TAX AGENDA, supra note 9, at 6. 
 99. Id. at 7. 
 100. See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT‘L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) (defining an epistemic community as ―a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area,‖ whose members hold a common 
set of causal beliefs and share notions of validity based on internally defined criteria for evaluation, 
common policy projects, and shared normative commitments). 
 101. OECD officials have articulated the OECD‘s position as ―both reactive and proactive.‖ 
Telephone Interview with OECD Official (Oct. 7, 2008), supra note 61.  
 102. See, e.g., OECD.org, OECD Information Disclosure, http://www.oecd.org/document/26/ 
0,3343,en_2649_34495_33945946_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (stating that the 
OECD produces ―‗soft‘ laws [that] are nonetheless effective thanks to the OECD‘s highly developed 
process of peer review‖); OECD.org, The OECD‘s Peer Review Process: A Tool for Co-operation and 
Change, http://www.oecd.org/peerreview (last visited Feb. 22, 2009) (―Among the OECD‘s core 
strengths is its ability to offer its 30 members a framework to compare experiences and examine ‗best 
practices‘ in a host of areas from economic policy to environmental protection.‖). For a comparison of 
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This kind of governance is shaped by the ideas, knowledge, power, 
capacity, and relationships of its participants. Understanding which type of 
tax norms emerge from the interactions that take place in these 
transnational networks requires identification of the participants, a means 
of understanding their values and beliefs, an ability to trace their internal 
information gathering, collaboration and decision-making activities, and a 
means of exploring their influence on other decision-makers.
103
 All of 
these inquiries would contribute to our understanding of the process by 
which tax norms develop. 
B. The Norm-Building Process: How Much Can Be Observed? 
Some aspects of the process of developing tax norms is observable in 
an ongoing, high-profile initiative undertaken by the OECD to eliminate 
tax havens.
104
 Recent news stories have highlighted the ongoing tension 
between wealthy (high-tax) nations such as the United States and 
Germany, and several small nations traditionally viewed as enablers of tax 
evasion, such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the Cayman Islands.
105
 
For many decades, the flight of capital to tax havens was a consequence of 
globalization that was occasionally bemoaned, but basically sanctioned, by 
national governments.
106
 However, in 1996, tax havens suddenly became a 
 
 
top-down and bottom-up globalization of regulation, see BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 7, at 
554. 
 103. See Haas, supra note 100, at 34; see also ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, 
CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2004). 
 104. The OECD‘s tax haven work is one of many distinct areas of influence on tax policy, and it 
may not even be its most influential. Other areas that may more directly impact substantive areas of 
law include its work on tax treaties and transfer pricing.  
 105. See, e.g., Glenn R. Simpson, Evan Perez & Carrick Mollenkamp, U.S. Tax Case Against UBS 
Grows Wider; Talks to Settle, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2009, at C1; Joanna Chung & Francesco Guerrera, 
UBS Agrees to Pay $780m Over US Tax Evasions, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 19, 2009, at 1; Steven 
Rosenberg, Liechtenstein Fury at German Tax Snoop, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22, 2008, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/europe/7259913.stm. 
 106. Charles I. Kingson, The Great American Jobs Act Caper, 58 TAX L. REV. 327 (2005) 
(arguing that every government knows that capital is evading taxation, but the situation is quietly 
ignored unless and until it becomes egregious enough to stir the public consciousness); Vincent 
P. Belotsky Jr., The Prevention of Tax Havens via Income Tax Treaties, 17 CAL. W. INT‘L L.J. 43, 45 
(1987) (―Tax havens have existed for some time but did not begin to present themselves as a major 
loss of revenue problem for the United States until 1970.‖) (footnote omitted); Craig M. Boise & 
Andrew P. Morriss, Change, Dependency, and Regime Plasticity in Offshore Financial 
Intermediation: The Saga of the Netherlands Antilles, 45 TEXAS INT‘L L.J. 377, 431 (2009) 
(―Reasonable people can differ over whether offshore financial centers in the 1970s (or today) 
primarily produced tax avoidance or tax evasion, or . . . led to capital inflows or money 
laundering.  However, regardless of the motive, as the offshore world grew in significance, it began to 
be perceived as a threat by onshore interests that had previously ignored it.‖). 
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matter of urgent international attention through the mechanism of the 
OECD.  
Over the course of several years, the OECD facilitated a process that 
transformed the issue of tax havens and tax evasion from a vaguely 
articulated problem to a concrete and coordinated transnational plan of 
action. The urgency of the tax haven problem first surfaced in 1996, when 
the heads of state of the G7 countries
107
 determined that tax havens were 
posing a threat to their collective financial order.
108
 The G7 (all of which 
are OECD members) issued a general summons delegating the matter to 
the OECD for a solution.
109
 The OECD Council delegated the task to the 
CTPA, which directed the CFA network to negotiate a consensus 
position.
110
 Using the CFA network‘s results, the OECD Council111 
produced a report articulating its consensus on a list of criteria to identify 
and counteract what it defined as ―harmful‖ tax practices.112 Subsequent 
OECD progress reports deemed certain regimes harmful, called for 
sanctions on uncooperative member and non-member states,
113
 and later 
 
 
 107. That is, the Group of Seven, a network for the finance ministers and central banks of seven 
industrialized countries (United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United 
Kingdom)—all of which are OECD member countries. The Group of Seven was organized in 1976 
and has a ―prominent, if ambiguous and not easily definable role in directing and steering governance 
and development trajectories.‖ ANDREW BAKER, THE GROUP OF SEVEN 1 (2006). Like the OECD, the 
Group of Seven uses its network to direct the development of consensus-based policies on commonly 
held fiscal issues.  
 108. These heads of state determined that ―[t]ax schemes aimed at attracting financial and other 
geographically mobile activities can create harmful tax competition between States, carrying risks of 
distorting trade and investment and could lead to the erosion of national tax bases.‖ Lyon Summit, 
Lyon, Fr., June 27–29, 1996, Economic Communiqué: Making a Success of Globalization for the 
Benefit of All, ¶ 16.  
 109. Id. (stating that the G7 members ―strongly urge the OECD to vigorously pursue its work in 
this field‖). The OECD Council further delegated the issue to the Secretariat.  
 110. Meeting of the Council at Ministrerial Level, supra note 57, ¶ 15(xv) (committing the 
organization to ―analyze and develop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax 
competition on investment and financing decisions, and the consequences for national tax bases‖). 
 111. OECD reports are rarely attributed to individual contributors or authors. Reports are typically 
not distributed until consensus is reached among all the OECD members. 
 112. OECD.org, More Information on the Harmful Tax Practices Work, http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/49/0,2340,en_2649_33745_33995569_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009); see 
also OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (Apr. 9, 1998), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/1/1904184.pdf [hereinafter 1998 Report]. 
 113. These sanctions were defined as ―defensive measures‖ that member states were to take with 
respect to uncooperative states, including imposing penalties and other economic sanctions, cutting off 
―non-essential economic assistance,‖ and other non-tax measures. OECD, Comm. on Fiscal Affairs, 
Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices, 
25–26 (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf. A 2001 OECD report 
reiterates that member states may use ―defensive measures‖ against states with tax regimes deemed to 
be harmful. OECD, Ctr. for Tax Policy and Admin. [CTPA], The OECD‘s Project on Harmful Tax 
Practices: The 2001 Progress Report 13 (2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/ 
2664438.pdf. Some practitioners suggest that the real threat presented by the OECD was ―unplugging 
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reported on compliance.
114
 Finally, in the most recent iteration of this 
work, the OECD‘s sense of urgency on tax havens was projected by the 
G20, yet another intergovernmental network which comprises several 
OECD member nations and a select group of other countries that have 
been identified for possible OECD membership.
115
 
Because of the OECD‘s work, it is now possible to identify an 
ostensibly global consensus on the problem of tax havens.
116
 The 
consensus involves a working definition of the term, a long list of 
countries that have taken steps to conform their rules to comply with 
OECD mandates, a short list of countries still considered to be tax 
 
 
the offshore tax centers from the global financial grid.‖ See, e.g., Patrick Tracey, Int‘l Taxes: Harmful 
Tax Competition Furor Raises Specter of Global Tax Forum, 19 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-4 (Jan. 
29, 2001). 
 114. See OECD, CTPA, The OECD‘s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 Progress 
Report (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf (discussing regimes 
that had been labeled as harmful that had been abolished or were otherwise deemed no longer to be 
so); OECD, CTPA, The OECD‘s Project On Harmful Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress in 
Member Countries (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/17/37446434.pdf (same). 
 115. See What is the G-20, http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 
2009) (―The Group of Twenty (G-20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors was established 
in 1999 to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies to discuss 
key issues in the global economy.‖); see also OECD, OECD Invites Five Countries to Membership 
Talks, Offers Enhanced Engagement to Other Big Players, http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,2340, 
en_2649_201185_38603809_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) (―OECD countries agreed to 
invite Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia and Slovenia to open discussions for membership of the 
Organisation and offered enhanced engagement, with a view to possible membership, to Brazil, China, 
India, Indonesia and South Africa.‖). Each of the latter countries is a member of the G20, as is Russia. 
The only G20 developing country members not included in the OECD list for enlargement or 
enhanced engagement are Argentina and Saudi Arabia. Argentina participates as an observer on 
multiple committees and working parties, including in the area of tax policy. OECD, THE OECD‘S 
GLOBAL RELATIONS PROGRAM 2007–08, at 18–22, 52, 109, 131, 138, 155, available at http://www. 
oecd.org/dataoecd/57/5/39109041.pdf. Saudi Arabia also appears to have some history of interaction 
with the OECD. See, e.g., MENA-OECD Investment Programme, Working Group 4 Meeting, Hosted 
by Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA) Feb. 7–8, 2005, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/16/34472285.pdf.  
 116. This does not imply that the problem is solved or the consensus is static, however. Recently, 
several countries have expressed a renewed interest in revisiting the issue of tax havens, and recent 
high-profile media stories, such as those involving Liechtenstein and Switzerland, may prompt another 
round of consensus-building. See, e.g., David D. Stewart, G-8 Finance Ministers to Discuss OECD 
Blacklist, 2008 Worldwide Tax Daily (Tax Analysts), at 115-1 (June 13, 2008) (―At the June 13–14 G-
8 Finance Ministers Meeting in Osaka, Japan, representatives will discuss a move by some members to 
revisit the OECD blacklist of uncooperative tax havens.‖); France, Germany Led Charge for New Tax 
Havens Blacklist, AGENCE FR. PRESS, Oct. 21, 2008, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ 
ALeqM5isimBdHGnswLKE6vRmsYeH98SyIA (―Seventeen countries led by France and Germany 
decided on Tuesday to draw up a new blacklist of tax havens which could include Switzerland, in a 
first step toward rewriting the rules of global finance.‖); Not-So-Safe Havens, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 
2009, at 53 (―The European Union is mounting a renewed campaign against tax havens deemed to be 
unco-operative ahead of a meeting of G20 countries in April.‖). 
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havens,
117
 and annual meetings to continue the effort to police the sorts of 
tax schemes governments may and may not pursue. Recently, the OECD 
Secretary General asked OECD member countries to continue to use the 
OECD as a source of policy in this area, with a specific request for ―a 
mandate to OECD to produce a methodology that would produce more 
reliable data on the size of the [tax haven] problem, since this would 
provide a firmer footing for the political debate.‖118 We may therefore 
expect the OECD to continue to play an integral role in the area of tax 
havens and tax evasion, even if we know little about how the tasks will be 
delegated. 
The sequence of events in the tax haven initiative demonstrates that the 
OECD plays a facilitative role in tax policy development, but it does not 
reveal how ideas developed and flowed through the institution or what 
mechanisms led to consensus. We cannot observe, for example, why this 
particular issue arose for the G7 ministers when it did,
119
 who framed the 
areas and issues to be studied in response to the G7 communiqué to the 
OECD, who participated in the various levels of delegation and 
negotiation, or how the solutions were devised. Similarly, we cannot know 
what sources contributed to the development of ideas, or the interpersonal 
or institutional pressures that defined the range of potential policy 
alternatives.
120
 If the debate had taken place within the U.S. law-making 
system, we might be able to re-create the process to some degree by 
consulting official records of legislative committees and public 
meetings.
121
 But the OECD is not a law-making body and is not open to 
direct public scrutiny in the same manner.
122
  
 
 
 117. Namely, Liechtenstein, Andorra, and Monaco. 
 118. Angel Gurría, Sec‘y Gen., OECD, Remarks at the Conference on the Fight Against 
International Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Improving Transparency and Stepping Up Exchange of 
Information in Tax Matters (Oct. 21, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
12/0,3343,en_2649_33745_41542604_1_1_1_37427,00.html). 
 119. Consistent with their shared political systems and intellectual backgrounds, the G7 finance 
ministers and central banks approach problems with a shared normative framework of economic 
principles that informs both what kinds of problems they identify and how they expect the problems to 
be addressed. BAKER, supra note 107, at 66 (―[T]he extent to which the G7 finance ministries and 
central banks share [a] basic consensus is often underestimated, while the extent to which a 
qualitatively different set of beliefs and principles have emerged in its place is often overstated.‖). 
 120. Especially in the case of complex technical regulation, ―ideas are political and serve political 
purposes, because the accompanying intellectual case and supporting evidence is often disputed or far 
from clear cut.‖ Id. at 66. 
 121. These records would probably include the names of participants, descriptions of the 
discussions, and drafts of documents related to, and considered in, the committee proceedings. In the 
United States, much of this information is readily available through a number of sources, including the 
websites of congressional committees, such as that of the Senate Finance Committee, at http://www. 
senate.gov/~finance/sitepages/hearings.htm; of individual members of Congress, such as that of the 
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Few of the internal processes by which these steps take place may thus 
be discerned through observation. The general public can learn about the 
OECD‘s tax policy work only by reading what the OECD chooses to 
publicize. This generally does not include detailed factual information 
about the collaborative process.
123
 As a result, the institutional structure of 
the OECD produces a significant impediment to understanding how issues 
were chosen, what points were negotiated, how ideas developed, and what 
factors led to consensus.  
More clues might be gathered through greater exposure to the key 
actors during the process of policy development, but the opportunities are 
limited. For example, a researcher might identify and follow a particular 
issue, such as the tax havens initiative, by attending various conferences 
where tax officials and experts present information in their capacity as 
OECD representatives or advisors. Some of these venues are fairly well 
known, such as the International Fiscal Association (―IFA‖).124 However, 
these conferences tend to be expensive, exclusive, and aimed generally at 
lawyers, accountants, and particular business interests.
125
 In addition, there 
 
 
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, at http://baucus.senate.gov/; and of the U.S. Library of 
Congress website, at http://thomas.loc.gov/.  
 122. Salzman, supra note 61, at 218. Even so, someone determines what (and how) issues will be 
addressed, who will be involved, and how much information will be made public. 
 123. There is no lack of official reports, press releases or statements on the OECD website—the 
OECD publishes some 250 books per year and countless press releases, newsletters, statements, 
reports, and other documents, including, in some contexts, ―consultation drafts‖ and working papers. 
See OECD.org, Publications, http://www.oecd.org/publications/0,3353,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1, 
00.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2009). For example, the Forum on Tax Administration has released a 
series of ―draft working papers,‖ which it describes as follows:  
These draft working papers have been written by the study team for the purposes of the study. 
They have not been endorsed in advance by the FTA which established the study. They 
therefore do not necessarily reflect the views of the FTA. The study team has made them 
available to facilitate full consultation with business and tax intermediaries and to provide an 
update on the progress being made.  
OECD.org, Tax Intermediaries Study: Draft Working Papers, http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0, 
3343,en_2649_33749_39006683_1_1_1_37427,00.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2009). The authors of 
these papers—the ―study team‖—are identified in the first working paper as ―the United Kingdom and 
the OECD Secretariat assisted by senior representatives from Australia, Canada, Chile, France, 
Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Spain, and the United States.‖ How the Study Team is Working 1 n.1 
(Tax Intermediaries Study, Working Paper No. 1, 2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
57/13/38393150.pdf. Presumably we can attribute at least some of the authorship to four individuals, 
namely, Chris Davidson, Lisa Wise, and Simon Lake (each affiliated with the United Kingdom Inland 
Revenue Service), and Richard Highfield (a member of the OECD Secretariat), who are listed as 
contacts for the work of the study team. Id. at 2. 
 124. The OECD works closely with the IFA to direct the topics to be discussed at annual 
congresses. 
 125. For example, the cost of attendance at just the central IFA annual congress can exceed 
$5,000. In addition, national chapters hold meetings within their regions, so that following a policy 
initiative through these networks would involve considerable effort and expense. 
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seem to be high personal and professional barriers to meaningful 
participation and interaction in these fora.
126
 Finally, the ability to identify 
an issue as it is developing is challenging outside of ―participant 
observation,‖ i.e., direct participation in the collaborative process such as 
in the capacity of an employee of the OECD, a national representative, or 
an expert consultant. Yet, outside of these large professional networks, the 
opportunities for empirical observation of the process of policy 
development appear to be remote or non-existent.
127
 
Only a limited understanding of the process of tax policy development 
through networking can be readily observed, but the inquiry clearly 
reveals that transnational networks like the OECD fulfill an extremely 
valuable function for their participants. Instead of addressing the problem 
of tax havens unilaterally or not at all, the United States chose to 
participate in the OECD‘s diplomatic, expert, and national official 
networks as they forged a consensus position on tax havens over a period 
of several years.
128
 Evidence of how states use the OECD helps explain 
how the network-based approach successfully produces and disseminates 
global tax norms.  
 
 
 126. The author‘s informal and confidential discussions with participants in annual IFA meetings 
suggest that the amount of access to individuals and information appears directly related to the quality 
of an individual‘s personal and professional ties.  
 127. This level of interaction with the public is by the design and discretion of those who make 
decisions within the various OECD committees. In other contexts on other committees, OECD policy 
work has been carried out in the context of open meetings to which non-state actors are invited, all 
documents are unrestricted and made available free to the public during negotiation and deliberation, 
and a broad and inclusive dialogue is fostered between private and public, state and non-state actors, as 
well as OECD and non-OECD member representatives and other interested parties with positions on 
all sides of the various issues being addressed. See Salzman, supra note 61 (describing OECD 
administrative procedures in the context of a project on standards for safety data of chemicals). That is 
not to say that similar openness should be the case for tax policy development. But it does suggest that 
it is important to understand why openness is the norm in some contexts while confidentiality is 
preserved in others, and who decides (and how they decide) that these should be the norms. 
 128. The U.S. administration apparently had a change of heart during the course of these events, 
leading Treasury Secretary Paul O‘Neill to distance the United States from the OECD‘s efforts. Press 
Release No. PO-366, U.S. Dep‘t of the Treasury, Treasury Secretary O‘Neill Statement on OECD Tax 
Havens (May 10, 2001), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po366.htm (―Recently, I have had cause 
to re-evaluate the United States‘ participation in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development‘s working group that targets ‗harmful tax practices.‘‖). However, this appears more to 
have served to redirect the OECD‘s attention than to eliminate the role of the OECD in addressing tax 
evasion: Secretary O‘Neill was careful to note his use of the G7 network to ensure that the U.S. view 
would be incorporated in future policy development. Id. 
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C. Evidence of Network-Driven Tax Policy Development in the United 
States 
One means of assessing the power of transnational tax networks is to 
examine how lawmakers use the OECD to explain or promote national 
legal change.
129
 In the United States, as in many countries, tax law 
emerges and evolves through iterative interactions among politicians, 
lawmakers, administrators, practitioners, taxpayers, advocates, the media, 
and academics.
130
 Lawmakers thus represent only one aspect of policy 
development and legal change.
131
 But lawmakers are specifically called on 
to publicly explain the reason for legal change to their constituents. By 
examining the ways in which lawmakers refer to the OECD within 
remarks recorded as part of the Congressional Record or otherwise 
publicly available (such as on individual websites), we may draw some 
inferences regarding the utility of the network-based approach to 
producing tax norms. 
First, U.S. lawmakers often use the OECD as a source of intellectual 
guidance for substantive policy choices.
132
 As one lawmaker explained in 
citing OECD statistics, ―These figures are compiled by what is known as 
the [OECD]. That is a fancy name for a statistical gathering group 
headquartered in Paris, which all of the major countries in the world 
support by giving it money. It gathers statistics on wages, taxes, and 
 
 
 129. Because the focus here is on the use of the OECD to promote domestic legal change, the 
following discussion omits reference to the OECD in matters of tax treaty policy, arguably the most 
prevalent source of transnational influence on U.S. international tax policy.  
 130. For a model of the law-making process in the context of corporate insolvency regimes, see 
Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and 
National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135, 
1147 (2007) (charting a bi-level arena of lawmaking in which various actors interact and exert 
influence at different stages of legal reform and development). 
 131. This is ―tax law on the books,‖ identifiable by virtue of its association with traditional 
lawmaking authority, through national legislative, executive, and judicial processes. Halliday & 
Carruthers, supra note 130. 
 132. For examples outside of tax policy, see, e.g., Ambassador Susan Schwab, U.S. Trade Rep., 
Remarks at Media Roundtable in Washington, D.C. (June 9, 2006), available at http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20060924213445/www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Transcripts/2006/June/asset_upload_fi
le598_9560.pdf, at 4 (―Look at the OECD report that just was issued within the last two or three days 
[which says that the] bulk of the benefits from a trade round in agriculture will come from market 
access . . . and we have a great agreement, the one thing that came out of Hong Kong that we can all 
point to is the elimination of [agricultural] export subsidies by 2013. That‘s the OECD study.‖); 138 
CONG. REC. S3,179 (1992) (using OECD statistics to compare the relative cost of prescription drugs 
among the United States and other OECD members when debating a prescription drug reform bill); 
Economic Report of the President (February 13, 2007) (transmitted to Congress, Feb. 2007) (citing, 
inter alia, OECD country data on oil consumption and imports/exports to explain the global economic 
rebalancing that took place during 2006). 
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everything. It is a fine group.‖133 Tax lawmakers have cited OECD 
statistics and guidance to promote technical tax changes,
134
 sweeping tax 
reforms,
135
 and even national budget strategies.
136
 OECD guidance also 
provides shortcuts for technical definitions, such as a ―foreign 
shipyard,‖137 a ―qualified foreign government security,‖138 or a ―tax 
haven.‖139 These may seem like mundane uses of a highly sophisticated 
transnational network, but the collective effect of these casual references is 
to position the OECD as an expert body entitled to deference.
140
  
By providing technical research and guidance, the OECD has become a 
credible source of information that U.S. lawmakers draw upon to ―pull‖ 
norms from the global into the national arena through the mechanism of 
emulation.
141
 Because the OECD‘s research usually involves extensive 
comparisons of member country practices, its guidance facilitates 
modeling, arguably one of the most effective forms of soft governance. 
For instance, outside of tax law, legislators have used other OECD 
countries as the benchmark for reform in issues as diverse as broadband 
access,
142
 humanitarian aid,
143
 and maternity leave.
144
 Similarly, in the area 
 
 
 133. 139 CONG. REC. 13,759 (1993) (statement of Sen. Packwood). 
 134. See, e.g., Introduction to Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act, H.R. 5951, 109th 
Cong. § 2 (2006) (introducing a bill to provide tax incentives for employers to implement wellness 
programs, citing the fact that the United States spends 56 percent more per capita than the OECD 
median). 
 135. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF 
PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (JCX-14-01) 
(Comm. Print 2001) (comparing OECD data on inheritance taxes in other countries to the U.S.-style 
estate tax); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., OVERVIEW OF PRESENT LAW 
AND ANALYSIS RELATING TO SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE PRESIDENT‘S INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
PROPOSALS (JCX-15-010) (Comm. Print 2001) (providing data tables on U.S. tax receipts from estate, 
inheritance, and gift taxes relative to OECD nations). 
 136. 139 CONG. REC. 13,759 (1993) (citing OECD statistics regarding the connection between 
rising taxes and spending as a percent of GDP); see also id. (―The ultimate question is: In 25 years, do 
we want to look like Sweden?‖). 
 137. 138 CONG. REC. H3,190 (stating that the Ship Building Trade Reform Act of 1992 defines a 
foreign shipyard as including one in a country that was party to an OECD agreement). 
 138. H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 109TH CONG., REPORT ON BANKRUPTCY ABUSE 
PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 120 (2005) 
(―The term ‗qualified foreign government securities‘ is defined to include [securities] that are direct 
obligations of, or fully guaranteed by, central governments of members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) . . . .‖).  
 139. Letter from James White, Director of Tax Issues, United States General Accounting Office, 
to Henry Watman and Jim Turner, Ranking Minority Members United States House of 
Representatives (Oct. 1, 2002) (GAO Doc. No. GAO-03-194R), available at http://gao.gov/new. 
items/d03194r.pdf (using the OECD definition to explain that four of the top one hundred federal 
contractors are headquartered in tax havens).  
 140. See supra text accompanying note 73. 
 141. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 7, at 546–47. 
 142. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. S3,400 (2002) (referencing U.S. position as fourth in the OECD to 
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of tax policy, lawmakers promote reform in the name of aligning or 
competing with other OECD countries.  
Sometimes these efforts appear to be very successful, such as in the 
case of reducing the corporate tax rate. U.S. lawmakers often compare 
U.S. corporate tax rates to those of the OECD in support of rate-reducing 
legislation.
145
 As one senator described the issue, ―tax is not merely a 
domestic decision anymore and that when the U.S. tax rate is at the top of 
OECD countries, Congress should be taking note.‖146 However, this 
success has been proven futile to the extent that the other OECD member 
countries are also engaged in comparison and emulation using the United 
States as a benchmark. Thus, the U.S Treasury has noted:  
Since 1980, the United States has gone from a high corporate tax-
rate country to a low-rate country (following the Tax Reform Act of 
1986) and, based on some measures, back again to a high-rate 
country today because other countries recently have reduced their 
corporate tax rates. . . . The evolution of OECD corporate tax rates 
over the past two decades suggests that [corporate income tax] rate 
setting is an interactive game subject to the pressures of 
international competition.
147
  
 
 
promote legislation featuring targeted subsidies for broadband access); 149 CONG. REC. S303 (2003) 
(citing U.S. decline relative to other OECD nations with respect to broadband development in support 
of a bill to provide targeted tax incentives). 
 143. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. 5,047 (1996) (citing the fact that in terms of percentage of GNP 
given as humanitarian aid, the United States ranks last in a list of twenty-one OECD nations). 
 144. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 
Stat. 1425 (June 19, 2003) (comparing OECD member country policies on childbirth leave for 
purposes of promoting reform in the United States). 
 145. See, e.g., FIN. COMM. RPT. ON THE JUMPSTART OUR BUSINESS STRENGTH (JOBS) ACT, S. 
REP. NO. 108-192, at 248 (2003) (stating that the U.S. corporate tax rate is too high relative to other 
OECD nations and therefore should be lowered); Carried Interest, Part II: Hearing Before the S. Fin. 
Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (Statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley) (referring to U.S. corporate tax 
rate in comparison to OECD averages); 154 CONG. REC. S5,835 (2008) (noting that the U.S. corporate 
tax rate is currently the second highest in OECD). The fascination with rates, though they paint a 
woefully incomplete picture of the burden of taxation, may be related in part to a similar obsession 
held by the media. See, e.g., Raiders of the Lost Taxpayer, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 2009, at A12 (―[T]he 
U.S. 35% corporate tax rate . . . is higher than in all of Europe.‖); Export Tax Follies, WALL ST. J., 
May 5, 2004, at A14 (―U.S. corporate tax rates are far higher than they should be. An OECD study 
before President Bush‘s 2003 tax cuts showed them to be the second highest in the industrialized 
world.‖).  
 146. A Tune-up on Corporate Tax Issues: What‘s Going on Under the Hood?: Hearing Before the 
S. Fin. Comm., 109th Cong. 2006 (Statement of Chairman Charles E. Grassley). 
 147. See, e.g., U.S. DEP‘T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION 
AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS BACKGROUND PAPER 1, 36 (2007); see also Eoin Callan, Greenspan 
Warns on Borrowing Costs, FIN. TIMES (London), July 27, 2007, at A6 (quoting former Federal 
Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan as saying, ―Other nations have seen the results of the bold tax 
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Other times, comparison to other OECD members has failed to garner 
sufficient support for significant legal reform to date. For instance, 
Congress has repeatedly pointed to the experience of other OECD 
countries as evidence of the need for a national sales tax.
148
 Nevertheless, 
the United States remains the only OECD country without such a regime.  
Norms can be pushed as well, through the kind of peer pressure that the 
OECD promotes as one of its most effective tools.
149
 The OECD suggests 
that ―recommendations resulting from [peer] review can . . . help 
governments win support at home for difficult measures.‖150 U.S. 
lawmakers are familiar with the use of peer pressure to compel particular 
policy choices. For example, in a Senate discussion regarding a proposal 
to eliminate government promotion of exports, the Secretary of Commerce 
called in from an OECD meeting to tell the Senate, ―Our global 
competitors are laughing at us [for thinking of taking the government out 
of the process].‖151 Even so, the degree to which OECD peer pressure 
 
 
reforms enacted by the US in the 1980s and they have moved to follow our example. And with much 
of the world having reduced their corporate rates, we now have the second highest statutory corporate 
tax rate among OECD nations.‖); Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Our Broken Corporate Tax Code, WALL ST. 
J., July 19, 2007, at A15 (―Over the past two decades, while . . . our statutory corporate income tax rate 
has increased, other nations have been reducing their rates to replicate our miracle. . . . It‘s not 
surprising then, that average OECD corporate tax rates have trended steadily downward.‖). Note that 
the last year in which the top corporate tax rate was lower than the current top rate was 1940. See Jack 
Taylor, Corporation Income Tax Brackets and Rates, 1909–2002, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN, 
Fall 2003, at 284, 287, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02corate.pdf. 
 148. See, e.g., STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 102d CONG., FACTORS AFFECTING THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES, at Part III (Comm. Print 1991) 
(discussing the viability of a value-added-style consumption tax, citing their widespread use in OECD 
countries); Record Testimony of Treasury Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy) Samuels Before the House 
Ways and Means Committee (testimony to House Ways & Means Committee comparing U.S. 
potential for consumption tax to OECD member countries‘ existing practices); James Bickley, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS: VALUE-ADDED TAX AS A NEW 
REVENUE SOURCE, CRS REP. NO. IB91078 (2002) (discussing viability of value-added consumption 
taxation in the United States based on OECD member country experience); Joint Economic Committee 
Report: Consequences of Replacing Federal Taxes with a Sales Tax (explaining why most OECD 
countries have national value added taxes and quoting extensively from an OECD report on the topic); 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND REVENUE OPTIONS (1997) 
(analyzing how national value added taxation would work in the United States based on OECD 
experience and demonstrating that twenty of twenty-five OECD nations employed national value 
added taxes); PRESIDENT‘S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO 
GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA‘S TAX SYSTEM (2005) (including an extensive analysis of 
value added tax systems in OECD countries). 
 149. OECD.org, What We Do and How, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_ 
36761681_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (―Mutual examination by governments, 
multilateral surveillance and a peer review process through which the performance of individual 
countries is monitored by their peers, all carried out at committee-level, are at the heart of our 
effectiveness.‖). 
 150. OECD.org, The OECD‘s Peer Review Process, supra note 102.  
 151. 141 CONG. REC. S7,358 (1995). 
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actually works to inform policy changes in the United States is not 
explicitly addressed by legislators, perhaps because critics may quickly 
raise the issue of sovereignty to defeat proposed tax reforms.
152
 
These examples provide circumstantial evidence that networks provide 
U.S. lawmakers with a toolkit of soft governance mechanisms for 
facilitating legal change. Politicians and legislators may use the OECD as 
a source of information, guidance, and even pressure, to inform national 
tax policy choices.
153 
Of course, the path from policy development tools to 
the successful transplantation of norms is not clearly illuminated,
154
 but the 
way individual lawmakers use institutions such as the OECD to further 
their tax policy goals suggests that networks may have a larger imprint on 
the shape of U.S. tax policy than is widely perceived.  
IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF NETWORK-DRIVEN TAX POLICY 
DEVELOPMENT 
Given the opaque nature of transnational networks and their 
relationship to national lawmaking, it is perhaps not surprising that we 
may underestimate the impact on national tax policy of the hundreds of 
 
 
 152. See, e.g., Lawrence Speer, Conservative Think Tanks Attack OECD on Offshore Tax Scrutiny 
During Forum, 219 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at G-3 (Nov. 15, 2005); Papali‘i T. Scanlan, Globalisation 
and Tax-Related Issues: What Are the Concerns?, in INTERNATIONAL TAX COMPETITION (Rajiv 
Biswas ed., 2002); Video: The Moral Case for Tax Havens (Center for Freedom and Prosperity 
Foundation 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xf14lkyH2dM. 
 153. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it also bears recognizing that just as 
transnational networks impact U.S. tax lawmaking, the United States likewise uses these networks to 
effectively transmit local norms to the rest of the world. For example, U.S. lawmakers have noted how 
the OECD can help export certain U.S. tax rules to the rest of the world. See, e.g., I.R.S., PUBLICATION 
3218, REPORT ON THE APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 482 (Apr. 21, 1999) 
(discussing, inter alia, U.S. involvement in the OECD‘s work on adopting uniform standards for 
regulating electronic commerce and transfer pricing in multinational groups, and stating the intention 
to further contribute to the OECD to ensure international consistency in tax matters); I.R.S. 
Announcement No. 2000-35, 2000-1 C.B. 922 (indicating that the OECD used U.S. rules as the basis 
for an international standard for transfer pricing in multinational groups). In turn, the OECD asserts 
that its guidelines for transfer pricing in multinational groups, largely based on U.S. rules, serve ―as 
the basis for legislation in OECD countries and an increasing number of non-OECD economies 
(―NOEs‖).‖ CURRENT TAX AGENDA, supra note 9, at 5. For a discussion of the implications of this 
kind of ―globalized localism,‖ see BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL 
COMMON SENSE (1995). 
 154. As one OECD official explained it: 
It is difficult to move from an [OECD] event . . . and trace it to the end result, where a regime 
comes in with particular . . . requirements within policy and legislation. . . . I would never 
suggest that we go in and say this is how you should do things. Obviously, we have no 
checkbook so we can‘t enforce that. But the main point is to help establish a framework of 
discussion, help countries to avoid the worst choices, pick up the best. The goal is framing.  
Telephone Interview with OECD Official (Oct. 7, 2008), supra note 61. 
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technical tax conferences and committee meetings that take place all over 
the world every year. Because the network-based approach is ―soft,‖ its 
procedural aspects may avoid the direct scrutiny that is applied to 
domestic lawmaking processes and multilateral regimes like the WTO. 
But the soft law approach presents challenges for monitoring the 
autonomy/cooperation trade-off in the development of tax policy. These 
challenges highlight the need for more attention to the institutions and 
processes through which global tax policy develops. 
In contrast to domestic lawmaking and treaty-based multilateral 
regimes, the network-based approach to developing global tax policy 
norms does not formally bind states to particular actions. As a result, it is 
more difficult to assess whether states either should be or are in fact 
converging around consensus positions.
155
 The soft governance structure 
thus creates a lack of clarity between tax norms and tax laws that makes it 
difficult to identify the factors that lead states to embrace more autonomy 
or more cooperation in tax policy.  
Soft governance methods have engendered a great deal of uncertainty 
about legal status of tax norms created within the OECD,
156
 most 
especially in the context of international tax treaty interpretation.
157
 While 
scholars and policy-makers debate the relative merits of soft and hard 
coordinative methods,
158
 practitioners and administrators must navigate 
the uncertainties on a daily basis. As a result, soft governance may appear 
suited to create tax norms, but it fails to explain as a practical matter the 
extent to which these norms can be reliably used as a source of legal 
reasoning or authority. 
This uncertain legal status allows states to be opportunistic about their 
decision to cooperate or remain autonomous in specific tax policy matters. 
Cooperation appears to be most likely when like nations act in like 
fashion, and when they perceive that doing so will be to their long-term 
 
 
 155. See Christians, supra note 5. 
 156. See Beth Simmons, International Law and International Relations, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 187, 189 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008). 
 157. See supra note 10. 
 158. See, e.g., Anna di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499, 502 (2006):  
Some envisage soft law as the ideal tool for strengthening the European market, eliminating 
the obstacles resulting from the diversity of national laws and responding to the actual needs 
and demands of the business community. Others see soft law as the most effective means to 
implement a new social policy vision, coupling efficiency and solidarity, flexibility and 
security. 
See also Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in 
the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002); Trubek & Trubek, supra note 6. 
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interest.
159
 By aggregating the shared tax priorities of its member states, 
the OECD provides these like nations with an opportunity to adopt a 
uniform approach.
160
 However, these norms may be safely ignored, and 
even contradicted, any time it is perceived to be in the lawmaker‘s (or the 
nation‘s) interest to do so.161 A few lawmakers have explicitly recognized 
that the ability of states to unilaterally withdraw from a particular norm 
without losing their status in the network is a major impediment to 
achieving cooperation in taxation.
162
 As problems become more complex 
and ―states are tempted to defect,‖ the network approach can be 
undermined by adverse national acts or by institutional incapacity to 
compel compliance.
163
  
The impact of OECD norms is further obscured by the fact that the 
institutional structure and norms of the OECD do not replace, but 
generally work together with both national and multilateral lawmaking 
institutions and processes. Comparing the merits of domestic lawmaking, 
multilateral regime-building, and the soft governance approach of the 
OECD is compelling and necessary, but also challenging.
164
 It is not 
always obvious what drives legal change at a given moment. As a result, it 
is difficult to assess whether a given tax norm is the product of OECD 
influence, whether a better outcome could have been achieved by 
employing some other means of developing tax norms, or whether the 
 
 
 159. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE 
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 51–52 (1984) (―[I]ntergovernmental cooperation takes place when the 
policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of 
their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.‖ (emphasis in original)); 
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 7, at 553 (―Self-regulated cooperation without enforcement by a 
leviathan is possible . . . ‗when there is a commitment to follow the rules so long as (1) most similarly 
situated individuals adopt the same commitment and (2) the long-term expected net benefits to be 
achieved by this strategy are greater than the long-term expected net benefits for individuals following 
short-term dominant strategies.‘‖). 
 160. This may occur in part because ―dialogue that enables an issue to be defined as a problem 
constitutes incentives to subscribe to a global regime.‖ BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 7, at 553. 
 161. See, e.g., Pierre-Hughes Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 
YALE J. INT‘L L. 113, 115 (2009). A related implication is that the more nations diverge in their core 
approach to economic and fiscal policy, the less useful the network may be in achieving consensus. 
The inclusion of new nations in an existing network with the intention of broadening compliance with 
existing norms might therefore make it more difficult to settle on norms in the future. 
 162. See supra note 128 (discussing the change in U.S. policy toward the OECD‘s harmful tax 
practices initiative). 
 163. Verdier, supra note 161, at 115. For an example in a non-tax context, see 142 CONG. REC. 
S10,256 (1996) (presenting an argument from Senator Moynihan that a proposal is diametrically 
opposed to an agreement the United States is trying to arrange through the OECD). 
 164. For a discussion of the analytical limitations presented by the inability to compare 
institutional alternatives, see KOMESAR, supra note 32. 
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various stakeholders—governments, businesses, or individuals—should 
mobilize scarce resources toward hard or soft modes of legal change.
165
 
Finally, the OECD‘s success in developing tax policy norms may 
alternately invigorate or constrain national legal change, depending on 
factors such as status and power within the network.
166
 As the U.S. 
experience with corporate tax rates suggests, comparison and emulation 
can lock countries into ongoing and unwinnable regulatory races.
167
 While 
the United States voluntarily participates in drafting the set of global tax 
norms that have fostered this competition, the competition extends 
globally.
168
 The OECD has therefore begun to acknowledge that its ability 
to claim that its norms are ―internationally agreed‖ requires participation 
from more than its member states.
169
 However, increased participation 
may decrease the ability to achieve cooperation through soft governance, 
to the extent that new participants are insufficiently ―alike‖ to engender 
cooperation.
170
  
Clearly, network-driven policy development presents a broad spectrum 
of implications for legal change both within the countries that participate 
directly and those with more peripheral status. The tensions raised here 
may be among the most observable, but many more are likely to surface as 
governments continue to navigate the ever-increasingly challenging terrain 
 
 
 165. An additional unexplored phenomenon of soft governance is that mismatches in information 
by stakeholders with different resources might alternatively introduce specialized interest group bias or 
majoritarian bias, thus creating additional layers of analytical complexity for scholars, practitioners, 
and policymakers alike. See id.  
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their countries.‖). 
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of economic globalization. More analysis is needed to identify and assess 
the implications of using networks, rather than other institutional 
mechanisms and processes, to achieve national tax policy goals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Transnational networks are busy producing tax norms that impact 
national tax policy decisions. Using these networks, individuals are not 
intellectually or professionally confined to domestic society or its 
institutions, but are integrated into a mechanism for creating global 
consensus on particular issue areas. At the same time, the soft nature of the 
norms produced in networks ensures the competing goals of national 
autonomy and effective tax regulation through cross-border cooperation 
are constantly subject to negotiation. But the very qualities that allow 
networks like the OECD to foster collaboration appear to prevent 
meaningful access to their structure and processes: their power- and 
personality-driven nature makes them neither easily accessible nor well 
understood. If we want to understand how lawmakers develop national tax 
policy norms, we need a better understanding of the role of transnational 
networks in producing tax governance norms.  
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